CVE-2026-19676

CVE-2026-19676CVE-2026-19676

Description

The user-mode verifier for the peci_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_peci_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_handlers.c, checked only the device object permission and copied the caller-supplied struct peci_msg with k_usermode_from_copy(). That copy validates the outer structure only; the buf pointers and len values inside the embedded struct peci_buf members tx_buffer and rx_buffer remained fully caller-controlled and were passed unchecked to the driver. Every in-tree PECI driver dereferences those pointers in supervisor mode: peci_npcx_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_npcx.c and peci_it8xxx2_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_ite_it8xxx2.c copy hardware bytes into rx_buffer.buf[i] and read command bytes out of tx_buffer.buf[i], and peci_xec_read()/peci_xec_write() in drivers/peci/peci_mchp_xec.c do the same with no bound on rx_buffer.len at all. A user-mode thread that has been granted the PECI device object — the normal way an application exposes a device under CONFIG_USERSPACE — could there

Scoring

CVSS 7.8 ()
VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Last modified2026-10-22
Sourced from NVD. Curated for EU compliance use cases by Adam Lundqvist, Founder at SQUR.